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ABSTRACT 
This paper is an attempt to give new light to the controversial issue of uni-
versality in the Binding Theory, mainly in PrincipIes A and B. We will present 
evidence not only from synchronic and diachronic linguistics but also from results 
obtained in experiments in the field of Language Acquisition that will lead us to 
conclude that even if these syntactic PrincipIes exist, are by no means univesal. 
1. Introduction 
In this artiele we will discuss the apparent universality of the Binding Theory (hen-
ceforth BT). We will provide evidence showing that the standard binding PrincipIes, origi-
nally formulated in Chomsky (1981), are not universal. Our main purpose is not as much to 
make up three new principIes that accomodate this universal value -which are, probably, not 
necessary- as to give reasons for a rejection of these standard principIes within the minima-
list framework. 
2. Parameterization or universality in binding? 
One of the main points on which generative grammar focuses is universality. 
Chomsky (1981,1986), among others, has elaimed that the study of grammar should be con-
cerned with competence and not with performance. In other words, he thinks that linguists 
should aim to describe the language faculty of an ideal speaker-hearer, rather than his / her 
speech acts. In this respect, we could assume that if this language faculty is universal, we 
will not need cross-linguistic data to reach conelusions holding for alllanguages. However, 
we are aware a eloser look at other languages will prove very revealing, since it will shed 
light on controversial issues that have never been successfully accounted foro One of the 
main problems that arise concerning universality in language is the use of pronominal s and 
reflexives, which will be extensively discussed throughout this artiele. 
The crucial question we need to answer is, then, the following: What is universal 
and what parametric in the BT? At first sight, we may as sume that the three Principies of 
the BT, given in (1) below, are universal while notions like Ooverning Category, SUBJECT, 
Accessibility are parameters that vary from language to language. In fact, 1 willleave these 
notions aside, since I take for granted that parameters escape universality in the wide sen se 
ofthe word. 
(l) a. Principie A: an anaphor must be bound in its Oc. 
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B. PrincipIe B: a pronominal must be free in its ac. 
It is Chomsky himself who draws the distinction between a genetic or innate compo-
nent versus an experiential component in language acquisition. In his words 'The (funda-
mental) problem ... is to determine the innate endowment that serves to bridge the gap bet-
ween experience and knowledge (of language) attained' (Chomsky: 1986). That is, any 
speaker of any language is said to have an unconscious, tacit or implicit knowledge of his / 
her language. It is true that any speaker of a language has almost since birth the capacity to 
acquire a language. This capacity is shared by allliving beings, that is, not only humans but 
also animal s can speak a certain type of language. Obviously, any speaker makes use of a 
set of internalized rules, rules that have never been clearly defined. 
The approach that will be taken here is, then, very different to that proposed in stan-
dard versions of the BT. In Chomsky's terms, there are reasons to argue for the universality 
of the binding principIes. At first sight, the way they are standardly defined, they could seem 
to be innate, the parametric (or other) variation coming in elsewhere (e.g. with the definition 
of the governing category, or with the XO / XP level of the anaphor and therefore how far it 
can move ... ). Needless to say that if the principIes were re-defined, we could imagine that 
the language variation could be due to these principIes and not to something more periphe-
ralo However, there are reasons to argue that even the standard binding principIes, accepted 
since Chomsky (1981), are not universal. These arguments against the innateness of binding 
will come from two different sources. First, I will briefly discuss synchronic and diachronic 
linguistics, and then we will concern ourselves with Language Acquisition. It is worth men-
tioning that I take "universal" at this point as meaning both (i) "holding for alllanguages" 
and (ii) "surfacing at the same age period in every language in the world". 
Even though we may I think there are no structural binding conditions, we must still 
think that there are cognitive structures that probably are innate. Of course, we do not yet 
know nearly enough to say what is and what is not innate, nor can we see what is really and 
truly specific to language (especially since mainstream research deflects all attention away 
from any similarities between linguistic structures/processes/skills and other cognitive 
ones). 1 think the whole innateness question is a big red herrlng that impedes progress on all 
fronts. It seems to me that a serious heuristic problem is at least potentially involved here. 
The idea that BT is universal, i.e hard-wired, presumably only means that every normal, 
healthy human child "knows intuitively" that anaphors are by definition subject to PrincipIe 
A, requiring an antecedent within their governing category, while pronominals are by defi-
nition subject to PrincipIe B, lacking an antecedent within their local domain. This leaves 
wide open the question of what constitutes a pronominal versus what constitutes an 
anaphor, which I regard as language-specific. Presumably, the hypothetical normal healthy 
child has to figure that out on the basis of emprirical evidence. In theory, reflexives and 
reciprocals are regarded as anaphors while personal pronouns are pronominals. But does 
Language Acquisition data really bear out that children take this as given? Or do they go on 
the assumption that the distinction between anaphors and pronominals is unmotivated, 
assuming "X seems to obey PrincipIe A, therefore must be an anaphor, while Y seems to 
obey PrincipIe B, therefore it must be a pronominal", even though X happens to be (from 
the point of view of an adult's grarnmar) a garden variety personal pronoun while Y is a 
reflexive? This line of reasoning derives from the fact that at the age of five English-speaking 
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children stiH have not gotten it straight that the "-self' forms in English are anaphors. I am 
aware that one complication when trying to give an explanation to this is that "-self' forms 
in English are used also as emphatics. 
Our first hypotheses are stated as foHows: If the binding principIes were innate, then aH 
humans should show evidence of having them, regardless of the first language learned. That 
means either (a) aH humans should have them from the beginning, and never produce utteran-
ces violating them even as a child; or (b) aH humans should developmentally acquire them. If 
(b), there are stiH two different possibilities: (i) aH children should acquire the principIes in the 
exact same time frame, as I suggest, or (ü) the input data may affect the process of acquisition, 
so that certain parameters triggered by a given language may affect the process or sequence or 
timing of acquisition. 1 will reject (ii) on the basis of LA results. If the binding facts are 
acquired only from linguistic experience, we could not explain the differences in the 
acquisition between pronouns and anaphors that are shown in the tables below. 
2. Argumeuts agaiust universality of Principies A and B. 
2. 1. Arguments ¡rom synchronic and diachronic linguistics. 
The first reason to reject the universality of the binding principIes comes not only from 
cross-linguistic data but also from data taken from different stages of the same language. 1 
will only sketch out sorne ideas, which will be further developed in V ázquez Iglesias (Ph.D 
dissertation in progress). First of aH, we must mention the fact that reflexives and pronomi-
nals in many languages do not fulfiH PrincipIes A or B of the BT, e.g. Chinese, Korean, Thai, 
Italian, and Spanish, among others. Even in English, for which these conditions were 
thought, it is possible to find examples of free reflexives and bound pronouns under certain 
stylistic circumstances. Furthermore, the terminology used to define these PrincipIes confu-
ses uso It is hard to explain how PrincipIe A could apply in Old and Middle English, stages 
of English in which (i) a personal pronoun could have either a reflexive or a pronominal 
value and (ii) a "-self' form could be used with a pronominal value as weH. Anyhow, this 
violation of PrincipIes A and B across languages and even within the same language leads 
us to suggest that they cannot be universal. 
2.2. Arguments ¡rom Language Acquistion 
As I have outlined aboye, my counterarguments to the consideration of universality, i.e. 
innateness, of binding in such a wide way as it has been proposed are further supported by 
language acquisition experiments. Since we lack genetic and neurological approaches to the 
universality of language, the field of language acquisition has been considered the only 
proof that BT is innate. Let us summarize, then, the main approaches to the innateness of 
binding within this field, and analyze the proposals given in these artieles. 
2.2.1. Grimshaw and Rosen 
The first complete and rather innovating analysis was made by Grimshaw and Rosen 
(1990; henceforth GR). They argue that the three principIes are part ofthe UG that any child 
has inside. Their experiment consisted of presenting children with two different types of 
questions that are often asked when testing children's knowledge. They are given in (3-4) 
below: 
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(4) a. This is A. This is B. Is A washing him? 
b. A washes A. 
c. A washes B. 
(4) a. B says that A should touch him. 
b. A touches A. 
c. A touches B. 
On the basis of theses sentences, children are requested to find out the content of the tar-
get question in what is called the "act-out" type of question. At the same time, they must say 
whether a sentence such as (3a) or (4a) describes a picture (3b), (3c) or (4b) and (4c) respecti-
vely. In other words, they are asked about their grammaticality intuitions. This type of question 
is called "grammaticality judgement", and it is the most important in GR's opinion. 
Their experiment shows that children perform perfectIy well on questions concerning 
PrincipIe A of the BT and that they do not allow pronouns where reflexives are syntactically 
possible. However, when they deal with PrincipIe B, they come across sorne unexpected 
reactions on the part of the children. They find that children perform worse in this kind of 
examples, and this should not be the case if we claim that PrincipIe B is also innate. They 
do not succeed in explaining this peculiar result in the experiment. They just give sorne hints 
to solve this problem, that I summarize in (5) below: 
(5) a. Young children cannot give grarnmaticality judgements. 
b. Comprehension tasks indicate preferred interpretations rather than grammaticality 
judgements. 
c. Therefore, children's responses reveal their knowledge only indirectIy. 
d. The data do not indicate what is or what is not innate. 
e. Children know the coreference restrictions on pronouns. 
As early as 1983, it has been proposed by Reinhart that PrincipIe B does not apply to 
coreference in the absence of syntactic binding. This led him to formulate a Pragmatic Rule 
1, that constrains the use of accidental coreference. This new rule was called Intrasentential 
coreference, and reads as follows: 
(6) Rule 1: Intrasentential coreference 
NP A cannot corefer with NP B if replacing A with C, C a variable A-bound by B, 
yields an indistinguishable interpretation. (Grodzinsky & Reinhart, p.79). 
According to Reinhart (1983), this rule only applies to sentences with coreference but 
without binding. It could be the case, therefore, that children did not have an innate know-
ledge of Rule I (and, therefore, they would have to learn it) but that they did of PrincipIe B. 
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This would explain why their answers to pragmatic questions are not very successful. While 
still arguing for the innateness of both PrincipIe B and Rule 1, GR give an extralinguistic 
explanation to this poor performance. They c1aim that children are incapable to pay atten-
tion for a long time, so they get tired and respond what first comes to their mind. This is, 
obviously, a cruciallimitation to any research made with children. As Marcus et al. (1992) 
note, children usually produce more speech errors than adults. Performance factors can, 
therefore, prevent us from finding out what their real knowledge is. Besides, everytime a 
child behaves as a linguisticaHy-competent adult, slhe is surely imitating an adult's speech. 
It may be the case, though, that this competente is due, even, to chanceo If we take into 
account children's poor performance s on pronominals in English along with aH the impedi-
ments mentioned aboye, it seems very difficult to distinguish a universal PrincipIe B and a 
pragmatic Rule 1. In fact, I will try to prove later that both are pragmatic constraints 
(perhaps undistinguishable in terms of LA experiments) that need to be learned, just as 
stylistics, .... This can be observed with cross-linguistic data. If a child aged 4 does not use 
Rule I (or PrincipIe B) correctIy, this implies that it is not a faculty that he has inside since 
birth, but rather sorne linguistic rule he has not learned yet. This assumption is supported by 
the fact that as the child grows older and reaches the age of six or seven, slhe will be able to 
use this pragmatic rule just the way adults do. As regards children's perfect responses con-
ceming PrincipIe A, I also disagree with GR in c1aiming that this is enough reason to explain 
the innateness of this PrincipIe. It is likely that children have a c1ear notion of the semantic 
difference between reflexives and pronouns. Moreover, it is this semantic distinction that 
makes them choose a pronoun to express disjoint reference, and a reflexive to express anaphoric 
reference. The so-called logophors, or even the bound pronouns, are a result of stylistic and 
pragmatic usage, and their syntactic behavior has nothing to do with innate knowledge. 
2.2.2. Bloom, Barss, Nicol and Conway 
Let us consider now Bloom, Barss, Nicol and Conway's (1994) approach to the inna-
teness of binding. These four linguists explore the acquisition of anaphora from a very dif-
ferent point of view. They work with sequences produced by children aged from two to five 
in spontaneous speech, since they c1aim that this kind of speech causes les s pressure on the 
informants. As regards PrincipIe A, the results they reach are consistent with the idea that 
this principIe is innate. Furthermore, they argue that PrincipIe B is also innate and, contra 
similar experiments made by GR (1990) and Grozinsky and Reinhart (1993), they give plau-
sible reasons. In their opinion, if a child did not have an innate knowledge of PrincipIes A 
and B, we would expect a free choice of reflexive / pronoun in the same contexts. On the 
contrary, their statistical reports show that there is no such free variation in children's utte-
rances. Furthermore, children have an aImost adult-like performance for both pronouns and 
reflexives, and the very few mistakes they make are due to pragmatic factors. In principIe, 
this approach faces Iess problems than that of GR (1990), probably because of the method 
used in the experiment. It is observed, contra GR, that in spontaneous speech the difference 
between knowing a rule and obeying it is not very significant. The fact that the children are 
not conscious of their linguistic knowledge being analyzed makes them perform better. 
What is important in this analysis is that children do not allow pronouns and reflexives in 
the same contexts. We should, then, conc1ude that they have an innate knowledge of binding 
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constraints. In this sense, pragmatics would playa important role when ungrarnmatical sen-
tences are uttered. This would be a great solution as long as it would work for any langua-
ge in the world. We need to see sorne cross-linguistic data, for example in Spanish (and 
Italian). Recall that these languages use c1itics to express both reflexivity (i.e. Spanish me, 
te, se) and pronominality (i.e. Spanish lo, la, le, los, las, les). From what we have said befo-
re, it would not be expected to find a child using pronouns and reflexives in the same con-
texts in spontaneous speech. At the same time, and connected with this, it would be very rare 
to find children using pronouns and reflexives at random. Surprisingly, this is exactly what 
happens in the case of several Romance language, as we will see below. 
2.2.3. Experiments on Spanish: Otsu, Jakubowicz, Solana and Ortiz 
At this point we should go back to an old study which argues that BT is innate. I refer 
to Otsu (1981). Her experiment goes as follows: Given a sentence like (7) 
(7) The hippo remembered that the monkey patted him / himself 
six and seven-year old children have noproblems with its interpretation. However, younger 
children only perform well half of the time. These results seem to indicate, in Otsu's 
opinion, that children apply these PrincipIes correctly. The problem with these two approaches 
is, in my opinion, that they are not consistent with their results. In fact, what Otsu and 
Jakubowicz are suggesting is that age factors play an important role in performance errors. 
How can they still argue that BT is innate? Are they, perhaps, suggesting that we all have 
the same Universal Grammar, but this treats elements such as c1itics in Romance and pro-
nouns in Germanic languages in a different way? But, how do they differ? That is still an 
open question. Along these lines, we also find a similar experiment made by Jakubowicz 
(1984). He also comes to the conc1usion that at early stages children do not distinguish bet-
ween anaphors and pronominal s and tend to interpret both as bound expressions. In other 
words, in a sentence like (8) 
(8) John said that Peter washed him / himself. 
the pronoun him can be interpreted by three and four year-olds as coreferential with Peter, 
in violation of PrincipIe B. The problem with these two approaches is, in my opinion, that 
they are not consistent with their results. In fact, what these experiments are suggesting is 
that age factors are so important in the experiment results that learning of the syntactic beha-
vior of pronominals and anaphors is undeniable. In other words, how can Otsu and 
Jakubowicz still maintain the idea that BT is innate if performance errors are influenced by 
age? It is true that sorne things in life are innate but they do not show up till a certain age. 
For example, every child is bom with the capacity to walk or to speak, but he will not be 
able to walk till he is one year old, and he will not be able to speak till he is two years old. 
Along these lines, we could argue that our knowledge of the binding principIes is on our 
mind since birth, but does not surface tilllater in our lives. This would be a fair argument as 
long as we would find the same age requirements for all languages. Unfortunately, this is 
not the case so our assumption seems to fail on empirical grounds. 
Before proceeding to analyze our experiment, we should revise sorne of the studies on 
Spanish anaphora and try to reach sorne conc1usions. Solana and Ortiz (1982) also carried 
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out an experiment to test children's knowledge of binding. They worked with 28 children, 
ages four to six in a comprehension act-out task. They po sed sentences like 
(9) a. Juan dijo que Pedro se pateó. 
'Juan said that Pedro kicked himself.' 
b. Juan dijo que Pedro lo pateó. 
'Juan said that Pedro kicked him.' 
c. Juan ordenó a Pedro patearse. 
'Juan ordered Pedro to kick himself.' 
d. Juan ordenó a Pedro patearlo. 
'Juan ordered Pedro to kick him.' 
Children's interpretation of these data was not as perfect as it should be if they had an 
innate knowledge of the two PrincipIes. In fact, only 49% of the sentences were interpreted 
correctly by these children. The reason may lie in the complexity of the data given, that 
makes young children misunderstand the meaning of the sentences. Anyhow, it is clear that 
age is playing once more an important role here. 
2.2.3.1. Vázquez Iglesias 
Our experiment was made with a group of Spanish-speaking children whose age ranged 
from five to eight years old. First of aH, I gave 25 six-year olds a set of sentences containing 
pronouns and reflexives that can be used in the same contexts, and I asked them sorne 
questions to analyze the interpretation they give to each of these grarnmatical words. It was, 
therefore, a comprehension task, which is as useful as an act-out task, and less complicated 
when doing research with young children. 
My aim was to prove the logical assumption that seven and eight-year olds respond 
much better to these questions than five and six-year olds. However, they stiHlack the lin-
guistic knowledge required to interpret aH the sentences correctly. As the child gets older, 
his/her intuitions will greatly improve. In other words, the Strong Maturation Hypothesis 
does apply in the acquisition of the syntax of reflexives by children. If this assumption is 
correct, then we will expect an almost perfect interpretation of the sentences in question at 
the age of eight. 
As regards PrincipIe A, we notice that up to the age of seven or eight the children make 
several mistakes, confusing true reflexives such as se with pronominals such as lo, la, los, 
las. Thus, we posed sentences like 
(10) Ana se lava todos los días. 
'Ana washes herself everyday.' 
(11) Ana la lava todos los días. 
'Ana washes her everyday.' 
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Surprisingly, (lO), and not (11) was often misunderstood by seven and eight year olds.The 
results are shown in Table 1 below: 
Table I. Children's understanding of PrincipIes A and B in Spanish. 
7 year olds 8 year olds 
NPsubject = NP object 
SE intelTeted as reflexive 79.1%(19) 91.3% (21) 
SE interpreted as pronominal 20.9% (5) 8.7% (2) 
NPsubject '" NP object 
LOILA interpreted as pronominal 100% 100% 
LOILA interpreted as reflexive 0% 0% 
From this table we come to several conclusions. First, Spanish-speaking children do 
not reject the pronominal reading of a reflexive se, as early as English-speaking children do 
with "-self' forms. In fact, they do not show good knowledge of Principie A till they are 
more than eight, even in the simplest sentences consisting of a subject + a (reflexive) clitic 
+verb, as in (10). If this is cOlTect, then we might reject our previous hypothesis that adult-
like interpretations of reflexives on the part of children may depend on the difficulty of the 
structure under examination. Recall that pronominal s in simple sentences do not present any 
problems for our informants. Moreover, if this experience were crucial, how could we 
explain the fact that a Dutch child interprets an object pronoun as coreferent with the sub-
ject, while he allows the local reading of anaphors till he is five. This cannot be due to lin-
guistic experience, since adults are always aware that anaphors are local whereas pronouns 
are non-local. Besides, it does not account for the delay in the acquisition of Principie B in 
ECM constructions in Spanish, and a stronger one in Dutch. We must take into account that, 
at least in Dutch, constructions of this typt: are already present in three-year old children, i.e. 
they are part of the children's linguistic experience. 
Taking this issue a little further, we could suggest that, in fact, there is no delay in the 
acquisition of Principie A. On the contrary, what is happening is that children from six on 
begin to play with se and use it as a long-distance anaphor. Needless to say that SE (Simple 
Expression) anaphors in many languages, for instance in ltalian or Icelandic, have the pos-
sibility of being bound outside their goveming category. 
lt is likely that Spanish children think, at one stage, that Spanish is like ltalian in that 
sense. lt is worth mentioning that experiments made by Philip & Coopmans (1996) also 
show that Dutch children seem to use "zich" as a long distance anaphor or logophor when 
they are more than five, and after having demonstrated an adult-like performance on 
anaphors. In my opinion, the tests run here do not give us proof that these apparent 
violations of Principie A are consequences of a linguistic evolution on the part of the child 
that has already dominated local anaphora and plays now with language. 
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To recap what has been said so far, it seems that biological explanations to the innate-
ness of binding cannot be successful. Otherwise, we would expect these reflexives and pro-
nouns to be used correctly by children of the same age. Second, were these principIes uni-
versal, then we should find both English and Spanish children performing exactly alike in 
questions regarding PrincipIe A and PrincipIe B. However, it is worth mentioning that we 
carried out an experiment which shows that Spanish children performed better on questions 
in which PrincipIe B is involved. This is a surprising fact that has not been previously obser-
ved in experiments of this kind -neither for English nor for Spanish- and that is a valuable 
piece of evidence that supports our rejection of the universality in binding. Thus, Spanish 
children distinguish, at the age of five, the c1itic simple pronouns and give them a virtually 
adult-like interpretation (i.e disjoint reference) that English children are unable to give till 
the age of seven or eight. The so-called Delayed PrincipIe B Effect is more obvious in 
English than in languages such as Spanish and Italian. For instance, while in English it is 
already present in simple sentences, in Spanish and Italian it only shows up in complex sen-
tences such as ECM and quantifying constructions. 
Compare the results obtained in these types of sentences with five year olds. 
(12) Cada niña la seca. 72% adult-like 
'The girl is drying her off.' 
(13) La niña la ve bailar. 64% adult-like 
'The girl sees her dance.' 
It is true that the more difficult a sentence is the later the child will perform adult-like 
on it, but the tests run out in this chapter only show expected differences in the acquisition 
of pronominal s in simple and complex structures in a language like Spanish. I will not con-
cem myself with ECM and quantifying constructions since they are not relevant for the pur-
pose of this papero 
One could take the view that these differences in the acquisition of pronouns are due to 
the fact that languages with c1itics such as the Romance languages are harder to leam than 
those that do not have clitics. This view is valid on the basis of the results obtained in this 
experiment, but can be rejected on logical grounds. Every normal child is bom with the abi-
lit y of leaming to speak, read and understand any language, regardless of its nature. This 
should mean that a child in England or The Netherlands will acquire the skill of understan-
ding at the same age as a child in Spain or Italy. 
Once again, we note that experiments made with children of other languages cannot give 
us a c1ear explanation of what is ínnate (and, therefore, universal and applicable for all spea-
kers of alllanguages) in the BT.1t seems easier and more reasonable, perhaps, to assume that 
universality ín BT refers just to the semantic knowledge we have since birth to express that 
"someone is doing something to you" versus "you are doing something to yourself'. 
2.2.4 Cook & Newson 
The most recent argument in favor of the innateness of binding is given in Cook & 
Newson (96). I quote 
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"Step A is to elaim that the native speaker knows that in 
. Helen said that J ane voted for herself. 
Jane binds herself. [ ... (" 
"Step B is to see whether children could have worked this out from the speech they are 
likely to have encountered. Suppose children wrongly understand that "herself' is bound by 
Helen [ ... ( Nothing would tell the children that they are wrong; no context could let them 
unerringly distinguish the binding of anaphors and of pronorninals." (p.84f.)". 
Let us begin by discussing Cook's arguments supporting the innateness ofbinding prin-
cipIes. First, I can well imagine -as I have mentioned above- that children learn by induc-
tion and generalizations from a number of simple sentences in proper contexts, like, for 
example, "Jane hurts her" versus "Jane hurts herself' that "her" cannot refer to the Actor of 
the action of which her is the Patient, while "herself' must refer to this Actor. Note that I 
have used a typical reflexive verb in English, probably the frrst one a child hears in this lan-
guage. Verbs indicating personal grooming, such as "wash" or "comb", which are in the 
rniddle voice, do not use reflexive markers mucho Therefore, they are not good examples 
since they designate inherently reflexive actions, which many languages, ineluding English, 
keep formally separate from true reflexives, which are those actions that one normally per-
forms on another, and exceptionally on the self. 
Anyhow, if we apply this generalization to the example sentence given by Cook and 
Newson (1996) allowing also Benefactors alongside Patients, we still get the correct result: 
"herself' must refer to the Actor of the action of which it is the Benefactor. The fact that the 
anaphor is part of an embedded elause and that the matrix elause also has a ferninine sub-
ject NP does not interfere if the 'rule' is derived by induction and stated this way. In other 
words, it is far from elear why English-speaking children should overgeneralize and allow 
long-distance binding when there is no evidence in the input. The same question could be 
raised as to why children rnight allow local binding of pronorninals when, presumably, there 
is no evidence in input for a reflexive interpretation of things like "The horse kicked him" 
either. 
On the other hand, I would be totally convinced by Cook and Newson's (1996) argu-
ments if children never made the rnistake of using pronouns instead of anaphors or anaphors 
instead of pronouns during language acquisition. This would indicate that they do not pro-
ceed by induction and generalization. However, the experiments given aboye, both for 
English and Spanish, show that very young children do make these kinds of rnistakes with 
anaphoric expressions both in production and comprehension. It is true that children use 
pronominals instead of reflexives -as in "1 hurt me"- and vice versa, -as in "Sue's mother 
brushed herself' (when the agent and the beneficiary of the action are not the same person). 
These rnisconstructions take place before children have learned the correct adult pattems. 
However, I do not see the latter example as problematic for the Chomskyan Binding Theory. 
I can imagine two possible interpretations of this phenomenon: 
(18) The child is not using the anaphorical herself but the emphatic herself. 
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(19) The child understands the Binding Theory distinction between the theoretical enti-
ties "pronominal" and "anaphor", but does not know that "herself' is an anaphor. 
In other words, early child grammars might allow reflexives and (ungrammatical) 
locally bound pronominals in parallel distribution, at least in lexically govemed contexts. 
3. Conclusion 
To sum up, we may say that none of the experiments and data provided above support 
the claim that PrincipIes A and B of the Binding Theory are universal. Rather, they are con-
sistent with our preliminary suggestion that the innateness of binding should be restricted to 
the semantic distinction we all make between pronominality and reflexivity. From all these 
arguments, it seems more reasonable to claim that it is the possibility of expressing 
anaphoric or disjoint reference that is available to any speaker of any language, and nothing 
else. As regards binding, then, the Innateness Hypothesis should not go further than this. We 
have seen that the syntactic use of coreference, on the one hand, and disjoint reference, on 
the other, depend heavily on age factors as well as on the type of language in question. For 
instance, the fact that PrincipIe B is learned before PrincipIe A in Spanish but not in English 
is matches our claim that particular lexical items that indicate reflexive / pronominal mea-
nings need to be learned for each particular language. 
NOTES 
1. Our frrst intention was to work also with spontaneous speech in order to analyze chil-
dren's performance without their being under any pressure. In this way, we could compare 
the written responses with the unconscious use of pronouns versus reflexives in colloquial 
speech. Thus, we devoted some time to secretely recording children's every day utterances. 
After having recorded approximately 40 minutes for a smaH group of children, we transcribed 
aH their utterances and selected those contexts in which reflexives and simple pronouns 
occurred. Unfortunately, we realized that colloquial speech would require much more time 
of recording so that we could reach some relevant conclusions regarding the distinction of 
PrincipIe A and B by young children, so we decided to quit. 
2. Cf. Michael Barlow (1996), who shows how corpora reveal pattems that data from pure 
intuition can never reach, including frequency information that affects the generalizations 
speakers draw (again, both as children and as adults). He has a case study on reflexive mar-
king in English, which shows what the real pattems of reflexive marking are that people are 
exposed too This is quite different from the kinds of examples UG linguists think up. He pre-
sents a schema theory to describe the actual usage data found with reflexives. We must 
remember that UG is not about usage; language is somehow completely divorced from what 
happens when speakers use and understand language). 
3. Obviously, I do not regard the so-called long-distance reflexives as true reflexives, but 
rather as discourse-oriented anaphors. 
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